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Abstract
Location based access in wireless sensor networks (WSN) are vulnerable to lo-
cation spoofing attacks. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer (PHY-
layer) authentication in the threat of an intelligent location spoofing attack.
The intelligent attack can emulate the legitimate channel information and max-
imize its long-term cumulative reward. First, we analyze the feasibility of this
intelligent attack and investigate how it threats to the networks. Specifically,
we derive the optimal transmit power allocation and find the worst case for the
defenders, namely optimal intelligent attack, in which the attacker can learn
the intelligent attack action based on the beamforming with optimal transmit
power allocation. To defend against such an intelligent attack with high ac-
curacy and low overhead, we develop a cooperative PHY-layer authentication
scheme. Then, we provide an in-depth analysis on the belief and derive the belief
bounds and the closed-form expression for the belief threshold. Furthermore,
considering the whole computation complexity and the double counting problem
in a loopy graph, we propose the cooperative neighbour selection algorithm to
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accelerate belief convergence and reduce the overhead. Finally, the simulation
results reveal that the proposed method can significantly improve the defense
performance compared with the state-of-art methods.
Keywords: Physical layer authentication, intelligent location spoofing, WSN.
1. Introduction
Today, wireless sensor networks (WSN) have played an important role in In-
ternet of mission critical things (IoMCT), i.e., battlefield, border patrol, search
and rescue, etc. The location verification in WSN is key to location based
security IoMCT services [1, 2]. For example, as the location based access obvi-5
ates the need to establish shared secrets in advance, it can apace authenticate
a transmitter via the received signal strength (RSS). However, the open air
nature of wireless systems makes it vulnerable to physical layer (PHY-layer)
security threats [3]. One serious threat is called location spoofing attack, which
makes the attack impersonate the legitimate location to access networks. Such10
an attack can further cause denial-of-service (DoS), session hijacking, man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attacks, which makes PHY-layer authentication extremely
challenging.
Many location spoofing detection or robust localization algorithms have been
developed to address the location spoofing threats. The key idea is to distinguish15
radio transmitters by exploiting uncorrelated PHY-layer spatial information be-
tween the legitimate users and the adversary, such as RSS [4, 5, 6, 7] and channel
state information (CSI) [8, 9, 10, 11]. In [6], the optimal strategies to attack an
RSS based wireless location verification system (LVS), have been analyzed for
the spatially correlated shadowing channel. Similarly, the optimal attack strat-20
egy and the optimal LVS performance have been investigated in Rician fading
channel [7]. To withstand the location spoofing attack, a robust localization
algorithm has been developed in [12]. Compared with RSS, the CSI contains
more location characteristic information [8], thus can improve the localization
and spoofing detection performance. In [8], a user authentication approach25
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has been developed by exploiting power spectral densities, where the optimal
test threshold for a specified false alarm probability is derived. In [11], a CSI
based authentication scheme with optimal attack strategy has been proposed
over multiple input multiple output correlated fading channel. In addition, ma-
chine learning techniques have emerged to integrate with RSS or CSI scheme30
to further optimize spoofing detection performance [13, 14, 15, 16]. In complex
dynamic communication models, i.e., the hydraulic systems inspired communi-
cation models [17], the optimal solutions can be obtained by using metaheuristic
algorithms [18, 19].
However, the existing work mainly focuses on optimizing the attack strate-35
gies and the detection performances with respect to a “blunt” location spoofing
attack. The term “blunt” refers to attack action, i.e., whether launch attack,
without changing with the communication environments. Nowadays, the ma-
chine learning is emerging not only to enhance WSN security [20, 21], but also
to threaten WSN security. With the rapid development of artificial intelligence,40
the attackers can be smarter and more harmful than we have ever considered.
For example, different from obtaining the conventional instantaneous reward,
the attacker can use machine learning, i.e., Q-learning, to choose attack action
based on the communication environments and to maximize the reward based
on a series of time events. This reward is called long-term cumulative reward45
[22]. By using Q-learning, the maximum long-term cumulative reward can be
obtained by an attacker over a period of time.
The intelligent location spoofing attack investigated in this paper is an attack
that can emulate the legitimate channel information via beamforming and max-
imize its long-term cumulative reward. Specifically, the intelligent attacker can50
find the worst case for the defenders, namely optimal intelligent attack. That is,
the intelligent attacker can falsify the legitimate CSI and RSS via beamforming
with optimal transmit power allocation. Then, based on this optimal power
allocation, the intelligent attacker further learns the intelligent attack action to
maximize its long-term cumulative reward. Thereby, the channel information is55
forged and attack action is shifty, this intelligent location spoofing attack will
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have a significant impact to the normal operation of WSN. In related work [23],
one perfect location spoofing attack has been investigated, which can perfectly
mimic the location of legitimate user. However, compared with the aforemen-
tioned intelligent location spoofing attack, this attack is not smart enough, i.e.,60
the attack action cannot shift with the communication environments. Besides,
the work of [23] focuses more on how to design one attack but inadequately
tackles on how to defend against it. It is important to study the attack defense
strategies. Inherently, once the performance and characteristics of a new attack
are found, the emphasis is to propose the defense strategies with respect to this65
new attack. Thereby, motivated by the importance to study the attack defense
strategy, we develop a PHY-layer authentication scheme under the threats of
the investigated intelligent location spoofing attack and provide some detailed
analysis.
In developing the aforementioned PHY-layer authentication scheme, some70
key factors should be concerned. First, since WSN is resource-limited, the PHY-
layer authentication scheme should be with low overhead to prolong the life of
the network. Then, the WSN are generally multi-hop networks with various
topologies, which motivates us to consider a decentralized scheme to reduce
maintenance cost [24]. Moreover, the PHY-layer authentication problem can be75
transformed into the signal detection problem, and cooperative detection can
effectively improve the signal detection performance [25, 26, 27]. Whereas, there
is lack of adequate attention to bring cooperation in PHY-layer authentication
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Inspired by the above mentioned work [23, 24, 25, 26, 27], we propose a80
cooperative distributed PHY-layer authentication scheme to address intelligent
location spoofing attack. To the best of our knowledge, the answers to the
following questions are still missing:
• Is it possible to have an intelligent location spoofing attack to threaten
WSN?85
• How to address such intelligent location spoofing threats in PHY-layer
4
authentication?
The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We study a new intelligent location spoofing attack, which can maximize
the long-term cumulative reward. The feasibility of intelligent attack is90
analyzed and the optimal intelligent attack is exposed. Specifically,
1. The beamforming is derived based on maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE);
2. The maximum long-term cumulative reward is obtained via Q-learning;
3. The optimal transmit power allocation is derived by optimizing the95
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
• To address the intelligent attack, we propose a cooperative PHY-layer
authentication scheme via belief forecasting propagation. The developed
scheme only needs to communicate a short belief message with each other
rather than a long message, which leads to little transmission overhead.100
Specifically:
1. We design the local function and the compatibility function for Markov
random field (MRF);
2. We derive the belief bounds and obtain the closed-form expression
for belief threshold;105
3. We propose the cooperative neighbour selection algorithm to accel-
erate the belief convergence and reduce the overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
system model. In Section 3, the details of the investigated intelligent location
spoofing attack are discussed. In Section 4, we propose the cooperative PHY-110
layer authentication scheme with respect to the intelligent attack discussed in
Section 3. Simulations are presented in Section 5 and future work are discussed
in Section 6. We summarize this paper in Section 7.
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2. system model
In this section, we first introduce the channel model and then present the115
attack model. For ease of reference, important notations are summarized in
Table 1.




V> Transpose of matrix









i.i.d. Independent and identically distributed
N Number of samples
M Number of sensors
K Number of channel states
γ Threshold of likelihood ratio test




U(s, a) Reward obtained when a ∈ A is taken
in state s
ε Learning rate of Q-learning
$ Discount factor of Q-learning
ε Probability that the attacker chooses the
non-optimal action
Oi Observation state of sensor i





We consider a static WSN that consists of a sink node, multiple sensor nodes
and an intelligent attacker. We assume that the sink node and the sensor nodes120
are with fixed locations and are resource-limited devices with a single antenna.
The attacker is with fixed location once it is deployed and is equipped with
multi-antennas. Let b be the sink node, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} be the i-th sensor node,
s be the attacker. The channel coefficient from source a to destination d is
denoted as had =
√
d−ηad h̃ad with a, d ∈ {b, i}, a 6= d, where dad represents the125
distance between source a and destination d, η is path loss exponent and h̃ad
represents small-scale block fading, which follows zero-mean complex Gaussian
distribution with unit-variance. The channel had eavesdropped by s via antenna
c is denoted as had→s(c). All of the channels are assumed to be reciprocal and
spatially correlated.130







ib→swixsi + n, (1)
where pb and psi are the power budgets for the sink node and from the attacker
to sensor i, respectively. xb and xsi are the unit-energy genuine signal for the
sink node and illegitimate signal from the attacker to sensor i, respectively.
wi ∈ Cρ×1 is the beamforming using ρ antennas and hib→s = [hib→s(iρ + 1 −135
ρ), · · · , hib→s(iρ)] ∈ Cρ×1 is the wiretap channel vector to sensor i, n is denoted
as channel noise and is assumed to be independent of signal and follows complex
Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance σ2. Φ = 1 and Φ = 0
represent the present and absent of the attack, respectively.
1Note that this argument assumes perfect synchronization of sink node and attack’s trans-
missions when Φ = 1. Any imperfect synchronization is important in the detection process,













Figure 1: The intelligent location spoofing attack model.
2.2. Attack Model140
The intelligent location spoofing attack is depicted in Fig. 1, which has two
stages:
Wiretapping: When the sink node and sensors are communicating, the intel-
ligent attacker wiretaps uplink and downlink channel which can be denoted as
Hi→s = [h1b→s; · · · ; hMb→s] and Hb→s = [hb1→s; · · · ; hbM→s], respectively2.145
Spoofing: The intelligent attacker emulates the legitimate channel informa-
tion and learns the intelligent attack action to maximum long-term cumulative
reward.
In WSN, the sink node and the sensors communicate frequently, the attacker
do not wait to attack until the networks are idle. In other words, this intelligent150
attacker is an active attacker, which can launch attack when the sink node
and sensors are communicating. To attack successfully, the attacker should
guarantee the received deceiving signal power higher than the received legitimate
signal power per sensor [2].
2We assume that the wiretap channel estimation are perfect and the channel statistics, i.e.,
channel correlation matrix, are known.
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3. Intelligent Attack155
In this section, we analyze the feasibility of intelligent attack which can em-
ulate the legitimate channel information via beamforming and maximize long-
term cumulative reward via Q-learning. Then, we investigate an optimal intel-
ligent attack.
3.1. Feasibility of Intelligent Attack160
3.1.1. Beamforming
From (1), sensor i can decode the deceiving signal only when the i-th mimic
channel, gbi = h
†
ib→swi, is very close to hbi, that is |gbi − hbi| ≤ β for some
β > 0. The beamforming to sensor i is to maximize the probability P that
|gbi − hbi| ≤ β, which can be denoted by165
g∗bi = arg max
gbi
P [|gbi − hbi| ≤ β], (2)
where g∗bi is the optimal emulated channel.
By choosing the same column of uplink and downlink channel matrixes
Hi→s and Hb→s, respectively, i.e., the ρ-th column, we can get the vectors
hs↑ = [h1b→s(ρ), · · · , hMb→s(Mρ)]† and hs↓ = [hb1→s(ρ), · · · , hbM→s(Mρ)]†.





>, where h follows zero-mean complex Gaus-170
sian distribution with correlation matrix
R = E[hh†]. (3)







>, the optimal channel
g∗b = [g
∗
b1, · · · , g∗bM ]† can be achieved with MLE, which is given by [28, 11]




where R−1 is the inverse of the block matrix R. Denote matrix V = R−1, and
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By calculating the gradient of ĥ†(ĝb)Vĥ(ĝb) with respect to ĝb and setting
it to zero, i.e., ∂ĥ
†(ĝb)Vĥ(ĝb)
∂ĝb
= 0, we have
g∗b = −V−111 (V12hs↓ + V13hs↑) . (6)




−1g∗bi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M (7)
where (h†ib→s)
−1 is the Moore-Penrose inverse of h†ib→s.
3.1.2. Q-learning180
The objective of attack is to learn the intelligent attack action to maximize
the long-term cumulative reward. We quantize the channel had with a, d ∈
{b, i}, a 6= d into K levels and model it as an i.i.d. K state Markov chain
with had ∈ {h1, · · · , hK} [29]. In one time slot, the attacker chooses an action
to decide whether launch an attack or not. The action is determined by the185
feedback reward of the communication environments, i.e., channel coefficient.
Thus, we model action choice process as a finite Markov decision process (MDP),
which can be denoted as a 4-tuple 〈S,a, U, P (·|s, a)〉
• S is the state set with s = (hb,g∗b ,ps) ∈ S, where the channel vector
hb = [hb1, · · · , hbM ]†, ps = {psi|i = 1, · · · ,M} and the number of states190
is K2M . The size of states can be reduced to KM with s = (hb,ps)
3.
3This simplification is reasonable since the beamforming makes g∗b ≈ hb. If the system
states are large, the deep Q-network can be used [24].
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• a = {0, 1} is the action set, which represents whether to launch an attack
or not.
• U(s, a) is the immediate reward obtained when a ∈ a is taken in state s.
As in [30], we define the immediate reward as4











− psiCs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transmit cost
, (8)
where Cs is the unit transmit cost of the attack.
• P (·|s, a) is the transition probability of the next state, conditioned on195
action a being chosen in state s.
Q-learning can be used to generate a near-optimal solution to MDP [22].
Furthermore, Q-learning is a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm, and
we can obtain the optimal solution without knowing the state transition proba-
bility of MDP. We define Q(s, a) as the Q-function of state s with action a and
define V (s) = maxa∈aQ(s, a) as the maximum long-term cumulative reward of
state s with action a, respectively. Q-function is then iteratively via the iterative
Bellman equation,
Q(st−1, a) = (1− ε)Q(st−1, a) + ε
[
U(st−1, a) +$V (st)
]
V (st) = max
a∈a
Q(st, a), (9)
where ε ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate, $ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor, st is
the next state. To adequately explore the state set, the attacker utilizes ε-
greedy policy [15]. On this occasion, the probability we choose action a∗ can be
4Since the ratio between the throughput and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) is close to a constant throughout long range of bit rates [31], the SINR can be directly
used to represent the throughput in the simulations.
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expressed as200
P (a = a∗) =
 1− ε, a∗ = arg maxa∈aQ(s, a)ε, otherwise , (10)
where ε ∈ (0, 1) is a small positive value, i.e., ε = 0.1.
3.2. Optimal Intelligent Attack
From (1), when the attack is present (Φ = 1), the attacker and the sink
node are co-existence and the receive power is larger than normal (Φ = 0).
Particularly, the larger power the deceiving signal is, the higher risk the attack205
being detected. Hence, there is a tradeoff between transmit power and detection
probability of local observation. We find the worst case for the defenders, namely
optimal intelligent attack, in which the attacker can learn the intelligent attack
action based on the beamforming with optimal transmit power allocation. In
the following, we derive the optimal transmit power allocation.210
We define the local observation of sensor i as
ψ(yi) = E[y†iyi], (11)
where yi ∈ CN×1 is the receive signal in (1) with sampling number N . Let
f(ψ(yi)|HΦ) be the probability density function (PDF) of the observation ψ(yi)









where Λ(ψ(yi)) is the test statistic, γ is the threshold, Oi = 0 and Oi = 1
are the observation states of the attack. If the test statistic is less than the
threshold, the sensor accepts the hypothesis H0, otherwise, the sensor accepts
the hypothesis H1. If each term yi of yi is an i.i.d. complex Gaussian random
variable with zero-mean and variance σ2y, for large N , ψ(yi) can converge with220
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where K = pbd−ηbi +σ2. The optimal transmit power allocation can be found by
minimizing the detection probability of local observation, subject to the ergodic225




s.t. R̄si ≥ τ, (15)




However, the problem (15) is non-convex, since the ergodic transmit rate R̄si
is not a convex function. To make (15) tractable, we use the Jensen’s inequality
[32] to obtain the upper bound on R̄si. The upper bound dR̄sie is given in (16),
13



































































































Then, the problem (15) can be transformed to minimize the KL divergence from




































pbpsi. Based on the closed-form expression for function
















psi). Following (19), the second derivative of DKL
14






















0, which indicates that DKL is a convex function in psi. Following a similar pro-
cedure, we have d
2dR̄sie
d2psi
< 0, thus dR̄sie is a concave function. Then, problem
(17) is a convex optimization problem and the Lagrangian Lpsi,α is defined as
Lpsi,α = DKL[f(ψ(yi)|psi,H1)||f(ψ(yi)|H0)]− α(R̄si − τ),
where α is a Lagrange multiplier. Setting the derivative of L(psi, α) with re-
spect to psi to be zero, the necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions (21), (22), (23) are given as follows

















































For the problem of (17), the optimal transmit power allocation is given in
Theorem 1, proved in Appendix A.240
Theorem 1. For R̄si ≥ τ , the optimal transmit power allocation to minimize
15





















 dηbiσ2 − pb. (24)
Remark 1. We note that (24) explicitly captures the effects of the transmitter
location on p∗si. For example, when the distance between the sink node and
the i-th sensor is smaller, the optimal transmit power allocation will be higher245
than the case when the distance is longer. It is interesting to show that the
optimal transmit power allocation is irrelevant to the location of the attacker
(location-free). The reason is that the attacker utilizes the beamforming to
emulate the legitimate channel. This result emphasizes that this attacker can
perfectly hide its physical location, so it cannot be well detected via PHY-layer250
spatial decorrelation information, i.e., RSS, CSI.
4. Cooperative PHY-Layer Authentication
In this section, we propose the cooperative PHY-layer authentication scheme
with respect to the intelligent location spoofing attack discussed in section 4,
which is shown in Fig. 2. In the following, our analysis is based on the optimal255
intelligent attack, which is the worst case for defenders. Specifically, we formu-
late the cooperative detection model as MRF and provide the location function
and the compatibility function. Then, we develop the complete scheme and an-
alyze the performance. Finally, we propose the cooperative neighbour selection
algorithm to accelerate belief convergence and reduce the overhead.260
4.1. Cooperative Detection Model
When a sink node requests to access the sensors via location based proto-
col, the sensors cooperatively authenticate the sink node. We model sensors as
random nodes and multi-hop communication links as edges in set E = {ed|d =
1, · · · ,U}. For example, if two random nodes i and j can communicate mutual-265




Each sensor receives the signal from the 
transmitter and calculates the signal power
Each sensor exchanges messages among 
neighbours and updates messages
Each sensor generates messages based on the 
receive signal power
Each sensor generates a final message
Transmitter is authenticated Transmitter is unauthenticated 
No Yes
End
Figure 2: The process of cooperative PHY-layer authentication scheme.
there is no connections between them. We assume each random node i is inde-
pendent of non-neighbour nodes. In this case, the sensor networks are regarded
as an undirected graph G = (V, E), which can be further represented as a MRF
[33].270
In MRF, it defines two types of potential function, which are the local func-
tion φi(Si|Λ(ψ(yi))) and the compatibility function ϕij(Si, Sj |Λ(ψ(yi)),Λ(ψ(yj))),
respectively. The first one defines how confidence the sensor has to infer the
hidden state (real-life state) from the observation state. The latter one rep-
resents the correlation between hidden state Si and hidden state Sj . For275
simplify, let φi(Si|Λ(ψ(yi))) , φi(Si|Λi) and ϕij(Si, Sj |Λ(ψ(yi)),Λ(ψ(yj))) ,
ϕij(Si, Sj |Λi,Λj). We also define the potential function index set F = F1 ∪F2,
where F1 = V for local function and F2 ⊆ {{i, j} : i, j ∈ V, i 6= j} for compati-
bility function. Next, we analyze the two functions in details.
4.2. Local Function and Compatibility Function280
The local function φi(Si|Λi) denotes the inference relation between test s-
tatistic Λi (observation states Oi) and hidden state Si. In the following, we
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analyze the design of local function. Denote P (at∗|at−1) and P (ãt∗|at−1) as
the probabilities that the attack action will be change from an action at−1 ∈
{at−1∗, ãt−1∗} to the optimal action at∗ and non-optimal action ãt∗, respectively.285
Then
P (at∗|at−1) = P (st, at∗|st−1, at−1)
= P (st|st−1, at−1)P (at∗)
= P (ht−1b ,p
t−1∗
s |htb,pt∗s )(1− ε), (25)
P (ãt∗|at−1) = P (st, ãt∗|st−1, at−1)
= P (st|st−1, a)P (ãt∗)
= P (ht−1b ,p
t−1∗
s |htb,pt∗s )ε, (26)
where s = (hb,p
∗
s) is the state with respect to the optimal intelligent attack.
Since the intelligent attack action is time correlated and the current state is
correlated with the state in the previous time slot. Thus, it can be exploited for
intelligent attack detection.290
To simplify analysis, we set ε = 0, that is P (a = a∗) = 1. Note that
this simplification is reasonable since ε is a small positive value, i.e., ε = 0.01,
P (ãt∗|at−1) ≈ 0, and our analyses can be easily extended to the case of ε 6= 0.
When ε = 0, we can regard the intelligent attack action as a two-state Markov
chain. In such Markov chain, P (at∗|at−1∗) represents an intelligent attack action295
transition probability from time slot t− 1 to t.
In MRF, the belief can be used to estimate the marginal probability which
decides the real-life state of the attack. For example, in time slot t, if the belief
bi,t is less than a threshold, we use Si,t = 0 to represent the absence of the
attack, otherwise, we use Si,t = 1 to represent the presence of the attack. For300
this intelligent attack, the transition probability of the hidden state between
time slot t − 1 and t is given by P (Si,t|Si,t−1), where Si,t, Si,t−1 ∈ {0, 1} with
P (1|0)+P (0|0) = 1 and P (0|1)+P (1|1) = 1. It is seen that the state transition
probability of the hidden state is equal to the transition probability of the
18
intelligent attack action.305
Remark 2. Here, we obtain an important insight that the state transition
probability is proportional to the channel time-vary speed which is related to the
variation of communication environments. Thus, the intelligent location spoof-
ing attack is more serious in time-vary complex communication environments,
such as crowed urban areas.310
As analyzed, the current hidden state is correlated with the hidden state in
the previous time slot, we develop a temporal dimension on the local function
of MRF. Fig. 3 shows the relations among the current hidden state Si,t, the
current test statistic Λi,t, the previous belief bi,t−1, and compatibility function.






















Figure 3: The MRF with the temporal dimension. The green node represents random node
which is composed by the observation state Oi,t and the hidden state Si,t.
315
at sensor i. In this case, it is given a small value to represent the hidden state
Si,t = 0. When Λi,t belongs to Oi,t = 1, the attack is detected at sensor i. In
this case, it is given a large value to show the confidence of the hidden state
Si,t = 1.




Ω + κb̂i,t), Oi,t = 0








represents the one-step ahead belief prediction of the hidden state Si,t based on
Bayesian forecasting [35], 1Ω with Ω ≥ 2 is a uniform distribution, δ(Oi,t = 1)
is an impulse distribution, ς = 11+κ is a normalization factor, and κ ∈ (0, 1) is
a forgetting factor represents how sensor views the importance of the previous325
belief5.
Remark 3. Note that the local function gives a large value to the node when
infers the hidden state Si = 1 and gives a small value to the node, i.e., ς(
1
Ω +
κb̂i,t), when infers the hidden state Si = 0.
In the following, if no confusions occur, we omit the symbol bi,t−1 in φi(·) and330
the time slot index t in the subscript of Si,t, Oi,t and Λi,t. Note that the local
function has to update in each time slot, we propose the update process in Fig.
4. We find that the algorithm is recursive, that is, the local function φi in time
slot t is calculated by the belief bi,t−1 in time slot t − 1. For the initial belief
bi,0 in time slot t = 0, we consider an arbitrary value, i.e., bi,0 = 0.5.335
Start
Predict the belief in current time slot via (28)
Update the local function via (27)
Predict the belief 
Yes
EndNo
Figure 4: The process of local function update.
5Note that our proposed authentication scheme can be used to authenticate traditional
“blunt” location spoofing attack by setting the forgetting factor κ to be zero.
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The compatibility function ϕij(Si, Sj |Λi,Λj) represents the correlation be-
tween sate Si and state Sj . Sensor i and sensor j that are close to each other
are more likely to have correlated receive signal power, which means the ob-
servations from these users are more related than that from further away. For
illustrative purposes, we use the receive signal power correlation between sensor340
i and sensor j to represent ϕij(Si, Sj |Λi,Λj). Considering a less computationally
complex solution, we define the following simple compatibility function between
two neighbours via the Potts model [34]
ϕij(Si, Sj |Λi,Λj) =
θij , Si = Sj1−θij
Ω−1 , Si 6= Sj
, (29)




with 0 < θij < 1, θij  (1− θij)/(Ω− 1).
Remark 4. The larger θij is, the higher correlation the neighbour sensors will345
be. We see that the compatibility function encourages neighbour sensor to have
the same state.
4.3. Complete Scheme and Performance Metrics
Here, we propose the complete scheme and analyze the related performance
metrics. Belief propagation is an information passing algorithm, which oper-350
ates in a pairwise MRF to compute marginal probability associated with the
joint probability [36]. Since the cooperation of the sensors, all neighbouring sen-
sors can predict and exchange the information with each other using Bayesian
forecasting and belief propagation, namely, belief forecasting propagation.







ϕij{Si, Sj |Λi,Λj}. (30)
where S = {Si| i = 1, · · · ,M} is the hidden state set, and Λ = {Λi|i =
1, · · · ,M} is the test statistic set. The goal is to independently compute the
21
marginal probability P (Si|Λ) refers to belief for each sensor, and make decision-
s. We define an information passing from sensor j to sensor i as mij(Si). Since
belief forecasting propagation can be used to iteratively calculate the marginal360
probability for each hidden state, conditional on any observation states. In the









where Cj is a normalization factor so that m
l
ij(Si = 1) +m
l
ij(Si = 0) = 1, m
l
ij
means the belief about the state of sensor i, which is estimated by sensor j.365
When the algorithm convergence, i.e., n iterations, each sensor obtains its final





where ci is a normalization factor. Then the marginal probability P (Si|Λ) can
be approximately estimated via belief bi(Si). Theorem 2 proves the convergence
of the algorithm, and the proof is in Appendix B.370
Theorem 2. For binary variables with pairwise interactions, if






where |Jij | = − ln θij is the “couplings” of sensor i and sensor j, then belief
forecasting propagation is an `1-contraction and converges with probability one
to an unique fixed point irrespective of the initial information.
Remark 5. Here, we obtain an insight that when the number of sensors is375
large-scale, a smaller θij is required to satisfy the belief convergence condition.
We find that the convergence constraint is relaxed with the increasing of the
number of sensors. In other words, the more sensors within the WSN, the better
22
convergence performance the algorithm will be.
When all the sensors obtain the final beliefs, they compare the belief with a380






If the belief of sensor i is higher than the threshold bT , sensor i considers the
attack is present, i.e., Si = 1, otherwise not. The complete cooperative PHY-
layer authentication scheme is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Cooperative PHY-layer authentication
1: Initialize M , bi,0, Si,0, κ, bT , n;
2: Each sensor calculates the local observation via (12);
3: Each sensor infers the observation state Oi via (11);
4: Each sensor calculates the local function value and the compatibility func-
tion value via (27) and (29);
5: for iteration ← 1 to n do
6: Each sensor exchanges messages among neighbours and updates the in-
formation mlij(Si) via (31);
7: end for
8: Calculates the final belief via (32);
9: Each sensor finally decides the state (hidden state) of the attack via (34);
10: if Si = 1 then
11: The transmitter is unauthenticated;
12: else
13: The transmitter is authenticated.
14: end if
The detection probability and the false alarm probability are presented as385
follows





Pd,i = Pr(bi > bT |H1)
= 1− bi(0) ∩ bi(1)
bi(1)
, (36)
where Pr(·|·) is the conditional probability, bT is the belief threshold, bi(Si)
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is the belief of the state with Si ∈ {0, 1}. After belief iterating, the belief of
sensor i under the attack and without the attack are given by (C.2) and (C.4)
in Appendix C, respectively. After some algebraic computations, the bounds on390































































, and we omit Oi = 1 in
δ(·) for brevity. Please see the derivation in Appendix C.
Remark 6. From (37)-(40), We can deeply understand the algebraic relation395
among current belief, the previous belief, state transition probability and the
number of neighbours. For example, the bounds are exponential functions with
respect to the number of neighbours m.
The closed-form expression for belief threshold bT and the specific value of
it can be given in Theorem 3 which is proved in Appendix D.400
Theorem 3. For ∀ Pf,i, the closed-form expression for belief threshold bT is
obtained by
bT = Pf,ibbi(0)c+ (1− Pf,i)dbi(0)e, (41)
and the specific value of belief threshold bT can be obtained by predetermining a
false alarm probability, i.e., Pf,i = 0.1.
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4.4. Cooperative Neighbour Selection405
Since the whole computation complexity takes a time proportional to the
number of links in the graph, and the belief propagation are not exact due to
the double counting problem in a loopy graph [36], we propose the cooperative
neighbour selection algorithm to accelerate belief convergence and reduce the
overhead. In WSN, the quality of service (QoS) of each multi-hop link is different410
[37]. Our optimization goal is to select the neighbour sensor who has the optimal
multi-hop link to maximize global QoS, subject to no loop in the network.
Definition 1. Let the weight of edge is a mapping ω : E →W with the weight
set W = {wd|d = 1, · · · ,U}. Define the weight complement of edge ed as wcd =∑U
d=1 wd − wd, and define the new graph Gc as the complement graph of G.415
Based on graph theory [38], we formulate the optimization problem as finding




s.t. ∀ed ∈ E, ed ∪ T contains a loop.
This optimization problem can be solved by exploiting the following theorem,
which is proved in Appendix E.
Theorem 4. Solving the minimum spanning tree Tc of complement graph Gc420
is equal to search the maximum spanning tree of graph G. In other words, the
greedy algorithm can be utilized to maximize spanning tree T.
The weight of the edge ed is designed as
wd = Cω|hid|2, d = 1, · · · ,U (42)
where Cω is the unit weight, and |hid|2 is the instantaneous channel gain between
the i-th sensor and its d-th neighbour. The complete algorithm is described in425
Algorithm 2.
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Remark 7. Complexity analysis: The standard implementation of the infor-
mation passing on the loopy graph takes O(ML2n) run time, where n is the
number of iterations, and L is the number of the possible state for sensors, i.e.,
here L = 2. While, the run time reduces to O(ML2) by using the proposed430
cooperative neighbour selection algorithm in that the iteration passes through
each sensor on the tree only once. We find that the run time is linear increasing
with the number of sensors, which suggests that the overhead is low even in
large-scale networks. Furthermore, in information passing, only a short belief
message is needed to communicate with neighbours, which takes a low overhead.435
Remark 8. Efficiency analysis: To calculate the receive signal power, we as-
sume that each sensor takes O(1) run time. Then, with Remark 7, the total run
time of a single sensor is O(1)+O(L2). Similarly, we can calculate the total run
time of M cooperative sensors as O(1) + · · ·+O(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+O(L2) + · · ·+O(L2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
=
MO(1) + MO(L2). For M cooperative sensors, the average run time for each440
sensor is MO(1)+MO(L
2)
M = O(1) + O(L
2), which means the run time is linear
increasing with the number of sensors and the run time for each sensor remains
unchanged. In addition, with the number of sensors increases, the detection
performance has been significantly improved, which proves the efficiency.
Algorithm 2 Cooperative neighbour selection
1: Initialize probe messages;
2: for sensor ← 1 to M do
3: Broadcast probe message to the neighbours;
4: Feed back probe messages from neighbours to sensor;
5: Calculate the weight of each edge via (42).
6: end for
7: Obtain the maximum spanning tree via greedy algorithm.
5. Simulations and Performance Analysis445
We verify the theoretical analysis and show the performance of the proposed
cooperative authentication scheme by simulations. In the simulations, we set
26
the transmit power pb = 30 dBm, the number of samples N = 200, the noise
variance σ = −10 dBm, the path loss exponent η = 2 [39]. We set the WSN
coverage radius to be 2 km, the location of the sink node to be (0, 0), the450
location of the attack to be (0.5,−0.5). We set state transition probability to
be P (1|0) = P (0|1) = 0.4, P (1|1) = P (0|0) = 0.6, initial belief bi,0 = 0.5.
The optimal spanning tree topologies are obtained by using Algorithm 2. For
example, as shown in Fig. 5 with M = 9, 11, 13, 15, the topologies are optimal
spanning trees with no loop in networks. These optimal topologies are obtained455







































Figure 5: The network topologies via cooperative neighbour selection algorithm, where M =
9, 11, 13, 15.
Fig. 6 is obtained via Q-learning on ε-greedy policy with learning rate ε =
0.8, discount factor $ = 0.9 and ε = 0.15, 0.1, 0.05, Cs = 1 dB = 1.3 mW,
K = 3. As shown in the figure, the long-term cumulative reward converges to460
105.2 dB, 117.4 dB and 119.1 dB after 900 time slots, respectively. We conclude
that the intelligent attack can achieve a stable long-term cumulative reward
via Q-learning. Specifically, a high exploration, i.e., ε = 0.15, can converge to
a higher cumulative reward than a low exploration. This is because the high
27


































Figure 6: The long-term cumulative reward via Q-learning with different ε, instantaneous


















































Figure 7: The belief bounds vs. the number of neighbours.
exploration can avoid converging to the local optimum at the training process.465
However, the high exploration reduces the Q-learning convergence speed. For
example, the algorithm converges to theoretical reward at 500 time slot with
ε = 0.15, while it converges to theoretical reward at 300 time slot with ε = 0.05.
28
Fig. 7 demonstrates the lower bound and the upper bound on belief of
sensor i with Ω = 3, 3, 4 and κ = 0, 0.5, 0.5, respectively. With regard to these470
three subfigures, we find that the belief bounds are inversely proportional to the
number of its neighbours, except the upper bound on bi(1) with Ω = 3, κ = 0.
From the figure, we can conclude that the upper bound on bi(1) depends on κ
rather than Ω. We can also observe that the gap of the belief bounds become
smaller, with the increasing of Ω and forgetting factor κ. It implies that by475
considering the belief of the previous time slot, the uncertainty of the current
belief is decline. Furthermore, we can see that the bound bi(0) belongs to
the bound bi(1), which suggests that the false alarm probability Pf,i and the
miss detection probability 1 − Pd,i always exist. These phenomenons are also
confirmed by the Theorem 3.
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Figure 8: The belief threshold bT vs. the number of neighbours.
480
Fig. 8 analyzes the variation trend of the belief threshold. As the number of
neighbours increase, we see that the belief threshold is decreased exponentially,
which can also be confirmed by the insights in Remark 6. We also see that a
higher Ω and forgetting factor κ can lead to a lower belief threshold.
Fig. 9 illustrates the effect of different distance from the sink node to the485
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Figure 9: The final belief mean, variance vs. distance between attack and sink node.
attacker on the final belief with M = 9, 13. The simulation result is obtained
from 1000 times Monte-Carlo simulations. It is shown that when the distance
increase from 0.5 km to 2 km, the mean final belief and variance are almost
stable, which means the attack is location-free as analyzed in Remark 1. We
also find that the more sensors cooperation, the higher final belief the algorithm490
has. For example, the mean final belief is around 0.65 when the sensor number
is M = 13, while the mean final belief is around 0.5 when the sensor number
is M = 9. The result shows that the more sensors cooperation, the higher
robust the algorithm is. Note that although the intelligent attack is location-
free, the long distance between sink node and attack will increase the difficulty495
of beamforming.
Fig. 10 evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme via the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves in 10000 times Monte-Carlo simulations.
When the intelligent attack uses the beamforming with optimal transmit pow-
er allocation, the detection performance reduces more than 5% than the case500
with random transmit power allocation. Moreover, although more sensors can
cooperation to improve detection performance, it is hard to offset the influence
30























M=9, iteration 1, psi, i
M=9, iteration 1, p*si, i
M=11, iteration 1, p*si, i
Figure 10: The ROC of the proposed scheme with different transmit power allocation. The
optimal transmit power allocation vs. the random transmit power allocation.
that the optimal transmit power allocation brings. Thus, the optimal intelligent
attack which uses beamforming with optimal transmit power allocation is the
worst case in our analysis.






























S. Yan et al., RSS [5]
L. Xiao et al., CSI [10]
ELM based authentication [16]
Figure 11: The ROC of the proposed scheme vs. the benchmark methods: ELM based
authentication [16], CSI [10], RSS [5], and RSS in OR, Majority, AND.
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Fig. 11 illustrates the detection performance of the proposed scheme and
the benchmark methods under the threat of the optimal intelligent attack. In
the figure, the dotted line represents the traditional methods and the solid line
represents the machine learning inspired methods. It is shown that the proposed
scheme can significantly improve the detection performance. For example, the510
performance gain of our scheme over traditional CSI based method [10] more
than 50% with Pf,i = 0.1 and over traditional RSS based method [5] more than
40% with Pf,i = 0.1. It suggests that both CSI and RSS based method are
hardly detect such an attack. The performance of the CSI based method is the
lowest because the intelligent attack imitates the channel via beamforming. In515
addition, we leverage the RSS method as a benchmark and further compare our
method with RSS in three fusion rules, i.e., RSS-OR, RSS-Majority, RSS-AND.
The results show that our method obviously outperforms the RSS in three fusion
rules. As a machine learning inspired method, the extreme learning machine
(ELM) based authentication [16] has a better detection performance than the520
traditional methods. It is because that the machine learning inspired method
can obtain the deep channel characteristics from training data, thus can identify
the attacker more accurately. However, our proposed method is superior to the
ELM based authentication. Since the sensor cooperation and the history infor-
mation consideration are important factors in detecting the proposed intelligent525
location spoofing attack. In addition, when the number of sensors increases
from 9 to 15, the detection performance has obviously improved. It suggests
that the more sensors cooperation, the better performance the scheme will be.
6. Future Work
In this paper, we mainly focus on the static WSN scenario. It has many im-530
portant applications in mission critical internet of things, such as border patrol.
In such a scenario, the sensor are fixed deployment on the border to monitor bor-
der security. The mobile WSN also has widely applications in practice. Thus, in
the future works, we will investigate the cooperative PHY-layer authentication
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scheme in mobile WSN. In addition, the non-Gaussian noise generally exists in535
nonlinear stochastic models [40, 41], i.e., wireless channel model. We should
also consider the effect of non-Gaussian noise on measurements in the practical
systems.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a cooperative PHY-layer authentication540
scheme to defend against an intelligent location spoofing attack in WSN. To
attack, we have analyzed the feasibility of it and found the optimal intelligent
attack. To protect, we have modeled the networks as a MRF and have de-
signed the local function and the compatibility function. We have obtained the
expressions for the detection probability and false alarm probability. We have545
obtained the belief bounds and the closed-form expression for belief threshold.
We have proposed the cooperative neighbour selection algorithm to accelerate
belief convergence and reduce the overhead. The simulations have validated
the theoretical analysis and compared with five benchmark methods. Some in-
sightful remarks have obtained, for example: 1) The optimal transmit power550
allocation is irrelevant to the location of the attack. 2) We should be more
alert on such an attack in time-vary complex communication environments, i.e.,
crowed urban areas.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
According to the necessary and sufficient KKT conditions, the optimal trans-555
mit power allocation can be p∗si = dR̄
−1
si (τ)e or take a value in the open interval
(dR̄−1si (τ)e,+∞). This gives rise to the following two cases:
Case 1: Suppose p∗si = dR̄
−1
si (τ)e, in this case, (22) requires that α ≥ 0.
Substituting this into (23), we have dDKLdpsi /
ddR̄sie
dpsi






Note that (24) satisfies equation (A.1).
Case 2: Suppose dR̄−1si (τ)e < p∗si < +∞, in this case, (22) requires that








However, p∗si does not satisfy the supposing constraint, then the proof is com-565
pleted.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 1. Let (Q, ‖ · ‖) be a normed space (a normed finite dimensional real
vector space) and f : Q→ Q a differentiable mapping. Then, for q1, q2 ∈ Q
‖ f(q1)− f(q2) ‖≤‖ q1 − q2 ‖ · sup
q3∈[q1,q2]
‖ f ′(q3) ‖, (B.1)
where denote [q1, q2] as the segment {ξq1 + (1− ξ)q2 : ξ ∈ [0, 1]} joining q1 and
q2 [42].
Combining contracting mapping principle [33] and Lemma 1, we have the fol-570
lowing lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (Q, ‖ · ‖) be a normed space and f : Q→ Q be a differentiable
mapping. If supq∈Q ‖ f ′(q) ‖< 1, then f is a ‖ · ‖ contraction. Moreover, we
deduce that for any q ∈ Q, the sequence q, f(q), f2(q), · · · converges to a unique
fixed point q∞ ∈ Q with a convergence rate that is at least linear.575
The belief forecasting propagation update (31) can be rewritten as [33]





where ν̃j→i is the information sent from variable j to i, θj is the “local fields”
with respect to φj and ∂j = {v ∈ V : {j, v} ∈ F2} are the variables that
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interact with i via a compatibility function. Defining the set of ordered pairs
D , {i → j : {i, j} ∈ F2}, we see that the parallel propagation update is a
mapping f : RD → RD, (B.2) specifies the component f(ν)i→j , ν̃i→j in terms
of the components of ν. Denote the `1 norm of a linear mapping A on RD as





where Aij , (Aej)i, ej is the j-th canonical basis vector. The derivative of f







1− tanh2(θj + Σv∈∂j\iνv→j)
1− tanh2(ν̃j→i(ν))
sgnJij (B.5)
and the linear mapping Aj→i,k→l , tanh |Jij |δj,l1∂j\i(k).
Since supν∈Q |B(ν)j→i| = 1 and Aj→i,k→l are nonnegative and independent
of ν. For everywhere on Q, we obtain
∣∣∣ ∂ν̃j→i∂νk→l ∣∣∣ ≤ Aj→i,k→l. Choosing the `1
norm on RD, we obtain

















tanh |Jij |. (B.6)







tanh |Jij | < 1. (B.7)
For random nodes j ∈ V, substituting the maximum dimension of its neigh-
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bouring random nodes, (33) is obtained and the proof is completed.
Appendix C. The Derivation of Belief Bounds
Supposing the number of neighbours of sensor i is m, the messages passing
from neighbour j to i are independent. Substituting (31) into (32), we derive
the belief with attack in (C.1) at the top of next page. Then, substituting
(29) and (27) into (C.1), (C.1) can be transformed to (C.2). After algebraic
manipulations, we find that (C.2) is a function of θij with 0 < θij < 1, j =
1, · · · ,m. Taking logarithm to (C.2), we have (C.3). Note that each term of
(C.3) is a convex function. By maximizing/minimizing the log-function of each
term, we obtain the bounds on the belief of (C.2) in (37), (38). Similarly, from
(C.4), (C.5), we obtain the bounds on the belief of (C.4) in (39), (40). In (39),
(40), the bounds are piecewise functions, which depend on the one-step ahead
belief prediction.
bi(1) = ciφi(1)m1(1) · · ·mm(1)
= ciφi(Si = 1)[P (S1 = 1|Λ1)P (Si = 1|S1 = 1) + P (S1 = 0|Λ1)P (Si = 1|S1 = 0)]






δ(Oi = 1) + κb̂i,t
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ln bi(1) = ln ciς
m+1 + ln[δ(Oi = 1) + κb̂i,t]
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Appendix D. The Derivation of Belief Threshold580
From (37)-(40), we have bi(0) ∩ bi(1) 6= ∅, then from (35) (36), we have
Pf,i 6= 0 and Pd,i 6= 1 with probability one. We derive that ∀ (bi > bT |H0) ∈
bi(0) ∩ bi(1), ∃ (bi > bT |H1) ∈ bi(0) ∩ bi(1), and then we get bbi(1)c ≤ bT ≤
dbi(0)e. Since Pf,i 6= 1, we can further obtain bbi(0)c ≤ bT ≤ dbi(0)e.





After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain (41) and the proof is completed.585
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 4
Define the weight sum of graph G as S =
∑U
d=1 wd, then the weight com-
plement of edge ed is w
c
d = S − wd. By exploiting greedy algorithm, the prob-
37
lem can be transformed to minimize spanning tree of graph Gc, subject to









After some algebraic manipulations, we can get
max
wd
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